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20 September 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

Deputy Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

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SUBJECT:

Principals' Committee Meeting, 20 Sept., 1430-1600,

The White House Situation Room

- 1. PURPOSE OF MEETING This Principals meeting is primarily to get a readout from the negotiating team on their progress thus far and to consider the next steps, especially as we point towards an international conference. Also, JCS will give an update on the status of the bombing campaign if applicable. Sandy Berger will briefly mention the status of implementation planning thus far [there will probably be a DC on this topic Friday], and there will be a final section on Congressional strategy.
- 2. YOUR ROLE You do not have any formal responsibilities at this meeting. However, you may be asked for an intelligence update in one of three critical areas below. Needless to say, we'll give you the latest intelligence at the prebrief.
- Status of the Sarajevo Exclusion Zone. UN and NATO have announced that the Serbs have complied with the demand and in fact have withdrawn more equipment than the UN knew they had there--some 250 weapons. However, we believe there could be as many as 200 still remaining in the zone.
- Status of the Croatian/Muslim Offensive. The Croatians seemed to have stopped their offensive in western Bosnia, but this seems to be as much as the failure of the offensive thus far as US demarches. Meanwhile, the Muslims continue to press hard against the Ozren salient and have also launched attacks around Konjic. The latter attack-about 40 km southwest of Sarajevo has excited the Russians, who want the US to demarche the Bosnians. [Strobe Talbott and the DDCI were dealing with this issue this afternoon up in Annapolis. Also, the UN has accused the Muslims of firing mortars from within the exclusion zones in hopes of provoking the Serbs to respond, incurring further NATO airstrikes. Clearly the Bosnians are sniffing a victory and becoming increasingly disinclined to any concessions to bring peace.

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- Prospects for Serb Intervention. As it stands now, we don't see Milosevic intervening if Banja Luka appeared ready to fall. Should it go, however, the rest of western Bosnia becomes untenable and the northern corridor becomes irrelevant. A major refugee flow to Serbia could strengthen the hardline nationalists and complicate Milosevic's lift, but we think he can still hold on. A Croatian attack on Sector East possibly could still result in Serbian intervention, but even that is by no means certain.
- 3. PREPARING FOR THE MEETING In particular, you should read Bosnian Serb Defense in Western Bosnia and the Implications of the Fall of Banja Luka (MILITARY SITUATION tab) and Triggers for Yugoslav Army Intervention (SERBIAN INTERVENTION tab). I recommend you familiarize yourself with the assessment requested by the DCI on the Impact of the NATO Air Campaign in Bosnia that we produced with the Pentagon (AIRSTRIKES-IMPACT tab). Also, you may find particularly interesting the assessment on stress in the Federation after the Croatians discovered Iranian rocket deliveries to the Bosnians (ARMS TO BOSNIA tab.) Basically the Croatians are upset and even threatened to shoot down an Iranian plane delivering arms to the Muslims.

Ray Converse